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A decision taken with the intention
of protecting society against attack
by biological weapons could,
perversely, increase the very same
danger. That is the implication of a
debate now raging in the USA over
the support of research on
pathogens that might be used by
terrorists. An alleged shift in
funding in the wake of the 9/11
disaster and the ‘anthrax letters’
sent during 2001 means that more
laboratories are now working on
highly hazardous organisms. In
consequence there are greater
risks that such pathogens may be
released accidentally or be
acquired deliberately by terrorists.
The shift in financial support is
highlighted in a letter in Science
(307: 1409 (2005)) signed by over
700 microbiologists and
specialists in adjacent disciplines.
They argue that the US National
Institutes of Health (NIH) peer
review process, and the research
sector responsible for past
achievements in public health,
science and biotechnology, are
threatened by unintended
consequences of a decision by
the National Institute for Allergy
and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) in
2001–2 to prioritise work of high
significance for biodefence but
low significance for public health.
‘This prioritisation, which was
implemented by creation of
funding set-asides, special
funding review panels, and special
funding review procedures, has
transformed NIH-supported
research in microbial physiology,
genetics and pathogenesis,’ the
signatories write. ‘The result has
been a massive influx of funding,
institutions and investigators into
work on prioritised bioweapons
agents.’ Examples include the
organisms that cause anthrax,
plague, tularaemia, melioidosis
and brucellosis.
Over the same period of
funding, says the letter, there has
been a ‘massive efflux’ of funding,
institutions and investigators from
non-defence-related work on the
same aspects of microbiology. For
example, the number of grants
awarded for studies on model
organisms fell from 490 in
1996–2000 to 289 in 2001–January
2004 — a decline of 41%. ‘The
diversion of research
funds…represents a misdirection
of NIH priorities and a crisis for
NIH-supported microbiological
research.’
What is unquestionable is that
US research on biological
weapons agents has increased in
recent years. Following 9/11 and
the anthrax letters, the Bush
administration resolved to boost
appropriate work, and Congress
quickly approved an NIAID plan to
inject extra money into biodefence
research, including new
laboratories. According to Martin
Enserink and Jocelyn Kaiser
writing in Science (307, 1398,
(2005)), NIH Director Anthony
Fauci insists that this year’s $1.7
billion of NIH biodefence spending
(most of it at the NIAID) has come
on top of existing budgets.
The same article cites un-named
NIH officials as insisting that the
numbers in the microbiologists’
letter are misleading. A major
reason is that defence research
provides spin-off benefits for other
aspects of microbiology and public
health. ‘In a vigorous defence of
the program…Fauci said he was
able to strike a ‘deal’ with the
Administration that allows NIAID to
spend about one third of the
money on basic research and so-
called emerging infectious
diseases,’ say the authors.
The flow and counter-flow of
dividends from defence research
into ‘civil’ science make it unwise
to draw hasty conclusions
regarding the concrete outcome
of changes in the pattern of
funding. From the standpoint of
individual scientists, nevertheless,
the prioritisation of biodefence
work is likely to influence the
formulation of research proposals.
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So researchers who would prefer
to work with non-pathogens may
be tempted by the availability of
funds to focus on pathogens and
submit grant proposals to a
biodefence programme.
But this too has financial
implications, because dangerous
organisms can be investigated
only within expensive, high
containment facilities. Moreover,
there is considerably less existing
knowledge to build upon in the
case of most pathogens than
exists for familiar organisms.
Enserink and Kaiser cite as one
instance a microbiologist at the
University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Patricia Kiley is contemplating
switching her work on bacterial
sensing of oxygen levels from
Escherichia coli, to a bioterrorism
agent. Although tempted to do so
in order to ‘get a shot at the
current US biodefence bonanza’,
she is likely to make slower
progress using an organism
whose physiology and genetics
are less familiar than one that has
been a key microbe in laboratories
for decades.
Anthony Fauci insists that the
number of NIAID grants for non-
defence bacterial physiology
projects has remained fairly
constant, at 120-150 annually,
over the past five years. He
concedes that the number may
have fallen at the other relevant
institute, the National Institute of
General Medical Sciences, though
this has probably reflected tighter
budgets generally.
One of the prime movers behind
the microbiologists’ letter is
Richard Ebright, a Howard Hughes
Institute investigator at Rutgers
University, New Jersey. He has
previously publicly criticised the
proliferation of laboratories
devoted to pathogens of potential
interest to terrorists, because of
the risks of accidental or deliberate
release. Ebright believes that the
same objectives could be achieved
by increasing research on related
but harmless organisms, and by
restricting work on putative
biological weapons to a few,
strictly controlled centres.
Bernard Dixon is the European editor
for the American Society for
Microbiology. 
Louis Pasteur set up the Institute
that bears his name in 1888, in
order to scale up the development
and use of his vaccine against
rabies, and to study the microbial
agents of infectious diseases. Built
on his pioneering work on
microbes and sterile working
conditions, the institute flourished
and became the seed for a world-
wide network of subsidiaries.
Within the first century of its
history, the institute produced
eight Nobel laureates. In recent
years, it has made major
contributions to the genome
sequences of microbes including
the tuberculosis pathogen.
The end of the 19th century saw
the Pasteur Institute undisputedly
at the forefront of microbiology
and public health. At the beginning
of the 21st century, however, the
institute has looked like it could do
with some renovation in body and
in spirit. When Philippe Kourilsky
took office as director general in
2000, he was determined to
modernize the institute. Now, in the
last year of his six-year tenure, he
admits that the institute has run
into a crisis which is partly his own
responsibility. On March 15, the
institute’s ‘parliament’, the
assembly of 100, met to install a
new council, which will have the
task to find a way out of the crisis
and possibly a new director.
General discomfort among the
researchers — who call
themselves ‘Pasteuriens’ — with
working conditions, the funding
situation, and the general
management style of Kourilsky’s
leadership had simmered for a few
years, when the provisions made
for the renovation of the buildings
on the main Pasteur campus in
central Paris, three kilometers
south-east of the Eiffel Tower,
brought the discontent to a head.
Two of the buildings are in
desperate need of renovation,
which has been planned to a
five-year schedule and has to be
started as soon as possible, as
parts of the location are said to be
in violation of existing laws
concerning workplaces. The
crunch point is the Duclaux
building on the West side of Dr
Roux street, where a total of 255
research staff need to be
evacuated to allow the work to
start. The management wanted to
move the researchers to an
industrial site at Fresnes, 10 km
south of the city centre, and sent
out letters informing researchers of
their displacement without
individual consultation.
The move to Fresnes was
fiercely opposed by most of the
researchers concerned, mainly on
grounds of poor public transport
accessibility and isolation from the
facilities in central Paris, which are
vital to Pasteur’s involvement in
public health. The lack of
consultation and response to
internal assessments that had
declared the move unnecessary
had further enraged the
Pasteuriens. To resolve the
conflict, the director of the 
UK’s National Institute for Medical
Research, John Skehel, and
administrator John Wills were
called in for an independent
appraisal of the situation. In a
detailed report dated February
17th, they confirmed that a
‘decanting’ of some research staff
would be necessary. They suggest,
however, that by refurbishing the
two wings of the building one after
the other, the number of
researchers to be displaced at one
time could be limited to 150, which
could be housed at the nearby
‘Biotop’ business park. A
Pasteurien who prefers not to be
named reckons that “after the
Skehel report, and given the
current climate, the direction has
decided to abort Fresnes... The
idea now is to move the whole
campus to Palaiseau,” a science
campus 20km south of Paris,
which already hosts numerous
educational and research
establishments. The final decision
will be left to the new council.
While the building questions can
probably be solved with a bit of
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Hopes rise over Pasteur crisis 
The Pasteur Institute in Paris is
looking to move on from current
problems about its future.
Michael Gross 
